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Background and Epidemiology
Anthrax is one of the great infectious
diseases of antiquity. The fifth and sixth plagues
in the Bibles book of Exodus (1) may have been
outbreaks of anthrax in cattle and humans,
respectively. The Black Bane, a disease that
swept through Europe in the 1600s causing large
numbers of human and animal deaths, was likely
anthrax. In 1876, anthrax became the first
disease to fulfill Kochs postulates (i.e., the first
disease for which a microbial etiology was firmly
established), and 5 years later, in 1881, the first
bacterial disease for which immunization was
available (2). Large anthrax outbreaks in
humans have occurred throughout the modern
eramore than 6,000 (mostly cutaneous) cases
occurred in Zimbabwe between October 1979 and
March 1980 (3), and 25 cutaneous cases occurred
in Paraguay in 1987 after the slaughter of a
single infected cow (4).
Anthrax, in the minds of most military and
counterterrorism planners, represents the single
greatest biological warfare threat. A World
Health Organization report estimated that 3
days after the release of 50 kg of anthrax spores
along a 2-km line upwind of a city of 500,000
population, 125,000 infections would occur,
producing 95,000 deaths (5). This number
represents far more deaths than predicted in any
other scenario of agent release. Moreover, it has
been estimated (6) that an aerial spray of
anthrax along a 100-km line under ideal
meteorologic conditions could produce 50%
lethality rates as far as 160 km downwind.
Finally, the United States chose to include
anthrax in the now-defunct offensive biological
weapons program of the 1950s, and the Soviet
Union and Iraq also admitted to possessing
anthrax weapons. An accident at a Soviet
military compound in Sverdlovsk in 1979
resulted in at least 66 deaths due to inhalational
anthrax, an inadvertent demonstration of the
viability of this weapon. The epidemiology of this
inadvertent release was unusual and unex-
pected. None of the persons affected were
children (7). Whether this is due to differences in
susceptibility between children and adults or
purely to epidemiologic factors (children may not
have been outdoors at the time of release) is
unclear.
Anthrax is caused by infection with Bacillus
anthracis, a gram-positive spore-forming rod.
The spore form of this organism can survive in
the environment for many decades. Certain
environmental conditions appear to produce
anthrax zones, areas wherein the soil is heavily
contaminated with anthrax spores. Such
conditions include soil rich in organic matter (pH
<6.0) and dramatic changes in climate, such as
abundant rainfall following a prolonged drought.
Partly because of its persistence in soil, anthrax
is a rather important veterinary disease,
especially of domestic herbivores. In addition to
encountering anthrax while grazing in areas of
high soil contamination, these herbivores may
also acquire the disease from the bite of certain
flies (8). Vultures may mechanically spread the
organism in the environment (9). Anthrax zones
in the United States closely parallel the cattle
drive trails of the 1800s (10).
Anthrax spores lend themselves well to
aerosolization and resist environmental degra-
dation. Moreover, these spores, at 2-6 microns in
diameter, are the ideal size for impinging on
human lower respiratory mucosa, optimizing the
chance for infection. It is the manufacture and
delivery of anthrax spores in this particular size
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range (avoiding clumping in larger particles)
that presents a substantial challenge to the
terrorist attempting to use the agent as a
weapon. The milling process imparts a static
charge to small anthrax particles, making them
more difficult to work with and, perhaps,
enabling them to bind to soil particles (11). This,
in part, may account for the relatively low
secondary aerosolization potential of anthrax, as
released spores bind to soil, now clumping in
particles substantially in excess of 6 microns.
This clumping tendency, together with a high
estimated ID50 of 8,000-10,000 spores may help
explain the rarity of human anthrax in most of
the Western world, even in areas of high soil
contamination. Other potential bioweapons,
such as Q fever and tularemia, have ID50 values
as low as 1 and 10 organisms, respectively.
The Disease
Most endemic anthrax cases are cutaneous
and are contracted by close contact of abraded
skin with products derived from infected
herbivores, principally cattle, sheep, and goats.
Such products might include hides, hair, wool,
bone, and meal. Cutaneous anthrax is readily
recognizable, presents a limited differential
diagnosis, is amenable to therapy with any
number of antibiotics, and is rarely fatal. While
common in parts of Asia and sub-Saharan Africa,
cutaneous anthrax is very rare in the United
States; the last case was reported in 1992 (12).
Inhalational anthrax, also known as woolsorters
disease, has been an occupational hazard of
slaughterhouse and textile workers; immuniza-
tion of such workers has all but eliminated this
hazard in Western nations. As a weapon,
however, anthrax would likely be delivered by
aerosol and, consequently, be acquired by
inhalation. A third type of anthrax, acquired
through the gastrointestinal route (e.g., consum-
ing contaminated meat) is exceedingly rare but
was initially offered by Soviet scientists as an
explanation for the Sverdlovsk outbreak.
Inhalational anthrax begins after exposure
to the necessary inoculum, with the uptake of
spores by pulmonary macrophages. These
macrophages carry the spores to tracheobron-
chial or mediastinal lymph nodes. Here,
B. anthracis finds a favorable milieu for growth
and is induced to vegetate. The organism begins
to produce an antiphagocytic capsule and at least
three proteins, which appear to play a major role
in virulence. These proteins are known as edema
factor (EF), lethal factor (LF), and protective
antigen (PA). Following the A-B model of toxicity
(13), PA serves as a necessary carrier molecule
for EF and LF and permits penetration into cells.
Edema toxin results from the combination of EF
+ PA, lethal toxin results from the combination of
LF + PA. These toxins result in necrosis of the
lymphatic tissue, which in turn causes the
release of large numbers of B. anthracis. The
organisms gain access to the circulation, and an
overwhelming fatal septicemia rapidly ensues.
At autopsy, widespread hemorrhage and
necrosis involving multiple organs is seen.
Inhalational anthrax generally occurs after
an incubation period of 1 to 6 days (14). During
the Sverdlovsk outbreak, however, spontaneous
cases appeared to arise as late as 43 days after
the assumed release date (7). Such late cases are
unexplained but have potentially serious
implications for postexposure management of
victims of aerosol exposure. After the incubation
period, a nonspecific flulike illness ensues,
characterized by fever, myalgia, headache, a
nonproductive cough, and mild chest discomfort.
A brief intervening period of improvement
sometimes follows 1 to 3 days of these prodromal
symptoms, but rapid deterioration follows; this
second phase is marked by high fever, dyspnea,
stridor, cyanosis, and shock. In many cases,
chest wall edema and hemorrhagic meningitis
(present in up to 50% of cases [15]) may be seen
late in the course of disease. Chest radiographs
may show pleural effusions and a widened
mediastinum, although true pneumonitis is not
typically present. Blood smears in the later
stages of illness may contain the characteristic
gram-positive spore-forming bacilli. Death is
universal in untreated cases and may occur in as
many as 95% of treated cases if therapy is begun
more than 48 hours after the onset of symptoms.
While early recognition of anthrax is likely to
require a heightened degree of suspicion, the
diagnosis is supported by gram-positive bacilli in
skin biopsy material (in the case of cutaneous
disease) or in blood smears. A preponderance of
gram-positive bacilli in swabs of the nares or in
appropriate environmental samples might sup-
port a diagnosis of anthrax where intentional
release is suspected. Chest radiographs exhibit-
ing a widened mediastinum in the proper setting
of fever and constitutional signs and in the
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blunt trauma, deceleration injury, or postsurgi-
cal infection) should also lead to a diagnosis of
anthrax. This finding is only likely to occur late
in the course of disease. Confirmation is obtained
by culturing B. anthracis from blood.
Disease Management
While endemic strains of B. anthracis are
typically sensitive to various antibiotics, includ-
ing penicillin G, antibiotic-resistant strains do
(on rare occasion) occur naturally (16) and can be
readily isolated in laboratories. For this reason,
as well as the convenience of twice-daily dosing,
many experts consider ciprofloxacin (400 mg
intravenously (i.v.) q 12 h) the drug of choice for
treating victims of terrorism or warfare.
Doxycycline (100 mg i.v. q 12 h) is an acceptable
alternative, although rare doxycycline-resistant
strains of B. anthracis are known. Conversely,
however, the much lower cost of tetracyclines
compared to quinolones may factor into
therapeutic decisions, especially where large
numbers of patients are involved. These
recommendations are based solely on in vitro
data and data from animal models (17); no
human clinical experience with these regimens
exists. In cases of endemic anthrax, or where
organisms are known to be susceptible, penicillin
G (2 million units i.v. q 2 h or 4 million units i.v.
q 4 h) is recommended.
Postexposure prophylaxis against anthrax
may be achieved with oral ciprofloxacin (500 mg
orally q 12 h) or doxycycline (100 mg orally q 12
h), and all persons exposed to a bioterrorist
incident involving anthrax should be adminis-
tered one of these regimens at the earliest
possible opportunity. In cases of threatened or
suspected release of anthrax, chemoprophylaxis
can be delayed 24 to 48 hours, until the threat is
verified. Chemoprophylaxis can be discontinued
if the threat is found to be false. Levofloxacin and
ofloxacin would be acceptable alternatives to
ciprofloxacin. In addition to receiving chemopro-
phylaxis, exposed persons should be immunized.
On the basis of animal data (wherein an
appreciable number of unvaccinated primates
died when antibiotics were withdrawn after 30
days of therapy) (18), chemoprophylaxis is best
continued until the exposed persons has received
at least three doses of vaccine (thus, for a
minimum of 4 weeks). If vaccine is unavailable,
some recommend that chemoprophylaxis be
continued for 8 weeks (19). The available vaccine
was licensed (for preexposure prophylaxis) by
the U.S. Food and Drug Administration in 1970
and is prepared from a formalin-treated culture
supernatent of an avirulent B. anthracis strain.
It is given in a preexposure regimen at 0, 2, and
4 weeks, and at 6, 12, and 18 months. Persons at
continuing risk for exposure should receive
yearly boosters. Exposed persons should receive
at least three doses (at 0, 2, and 4 weeks),
assuming no further exposure is likely, before
discontinuing chemoprohylaxis.
Recently, a number of hoaxes involving a
threatened release of anthrax have been
promulgated (19,20), and guidelines have now
been published to assist in the management of
such threats (19). When evaluating a threatened
release of anthrax, the lack of volatility of the
disease, as well as its inability to penetrate intact
skin, should be taken into account. These factors
make it unlikely, in most cases, that persons
coming in contact with letters, packages, and
other devices purported to contain anthrax will
be at risk for aerosol exposure. Moreover,
because energy is required to aerosolize anthrax
spores, opening a letter, even if it contained
anthrax, would be unlikely to place a person at
substantial risk. For these reasons, postexposure
prophylaxis may not be necessary in many cases
of threatened anthrax dissemination.
Anthrax has little potential for person-to-
person transmission; standard precautions are
thus adequate for health-care workers treating
anthrax patients. Anthrax, as well as other
bacteriologic and viral weapons, has an
incubation period of >24 hours. This characteris-
tic is not shared by conventional, chemical, and
nuclear weapons and makes decontamination of
infected persons admitted to hospitals days after
exposure unnecessary in most cases. However,
in certain cases, such as exposure to a threat
letter involving an unidentified substance,
where anthrax cannot readily be ruled out by
Gram stain or other rapid diagnostic procedures,
decontamination may be warranted. In such
cases, decontamination may be accomplished by
removing clothing, sealing it in a plastic bag, and
showering with copious amounts of soap and
water. Environmental surfaces and personal
effects may be treated with 0.5% hypochlorite
after the area in which the agent was released is
investigated (19).
In summary, even though anthrax may be
among the most viable of biological weapons, it is555 Vol. 5, No. 4, JulyAugust 1999 Emerging Infectious Diseases
Special Issue
also a weapon for which a licensed vaccine and
good antimicrobial therapy and postexposure
prophylaxis exist. Given the relatively short
incubation period, and rapid progression of
disease, however, identification of the exposed
population within 24 to 48 hours and
employment of therapeutic and prophylactic
strategies are likely to present a challenge. Good
intelligence regarding the capabilities of terror-
ist groups, as well as heightened awareness of
the threat on the part of clinicians, first
responders, and public health personnel remains
a cornerstone of bioterrorism defense.
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